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A B S T R A C T
This paper presents an analysis of risk mitigation measures taken by countries around the world facing the
current COVID-19 outbreak. In light of the current pandemic the authors collated and clustered (using har-
monised terminology) the risk mitigation measures taken around the globe in the combat to contain, and since
March 11, 2020, to limit the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus known to cause the Coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19). This overview gathers lessons learnt, providing an update on the current knowledge for authorities,
sectors and first responders on the effectiveness of said measures, and may allow enhanced prevention, pre-
paredness and response for future outbreaks. Various measures such as mobility restrictions, physical distancing,
hygienic measures, socio-economic restrictions, communication and international support mechanisms have
been clustered and are reviewed in terms of the nature of the actions taken and their qualitative early-perceived
impact. At the time of writing, it is still too premature to express the quantitative effectiveness of each risk
mitigation cluster, but it seems that the best mitigation results are reported when applying a combination of
voluntary and enforceable measures.
1. Introduction
The modern world is fast-evolving, interconnected and highly mo-
bile, making risk governance based on the application of harmonised
biorisk mitigation measures a significant challenge. After the two zoo-
notic coronavirus outbreaks (the severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus [SARS-CoV] from 2002 to 2003 and the Middle East re-
spiratory syndrome coronavirus in 2012 [MERS-CoV]), another cor-
onavirus has crossed species to infect human populations, for the third
time in the 21st century (Perlman, 2020). This virus, provisionally
named 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV, further referred to as
SARS-CoV-2), was identified in Wuhan, China, in early January 2020
after cell culture and isolation of the viral particle (Zhu et al., 2020; Lee
and Hsueh, 2020). As for SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, the primary re-
servoir of the COVID-19 is probably the bat, based on sequence simi-
larity with bat coronaviruses. Presumably, the intermediate animal
hosts of 2019-nCoV should be among the wildlife species sold at the
Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market (Ye et al., 2020). Despite public
health risk mitigation measures and regulation efforts by many coun-
tries, regions and sectors, the current COVID-19 outbreak reminds the
world about our vulnerability to natural and man-made chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards and on the im-
portance of mitigation actions.1
Emerging biological hazards may include pathogens in new settings
due to climate change influencing the spread of vector-borne diseases
arising from the melting arctic ice (Smith et al., 2004; Sutherst, 2004;
Fox-Skelly, 2017). Other examples are pathogens with zoonotic po-
tential arising from intensive or inappropriate farming (such as avian or
swine flu, MERS) or spill-over of pathogens from wildlife due to the
continuous expansion of human territory (such as SARS, Ebola) both
bringing humans and potential animal vectors in closer contact with
each other (Mills, et al.,2010). These new agents may cause significant
threats to human health, if they display high infectivity with potentially
high morbidity or even lethality.
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On January 30, 2020, a panel of experts of the World Health
Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak of SARS-CoV2, causing the
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC) and on March 11 2020, the ongoing
COVID-19 outbreak was upscaled by the WHO to its 6th and highest
alert scale as a pandemic (WHO, 2020).
For many years the risk of emerging infectious diseases with pan-
demic potential was declared a major threat to global health security
and addressed by many stakeholders around the world; namely WHO,
global health security initiative (GHSI) 2001, nuclear threat initiative
(NTI) who have been very active recently in the bio field, the European
Parliament, various national or regional Centre’s of Disease Control,
etc. (McCloskey et al., 2014). The degree to which countries translated
these warnings and recommendations on prevention, preparedness and
response capacity varies. In many countries, priorities were given to
other domains and investments into appropriate and effective personal
protective equipment (PPE) stocks in healthcare facilities and other first
responder institutions were left behind (Papp et al., 2020). According to
these authors, there is also a long lasting and ongoing trend in our
societies to undermine scientific facts in the domain of public health
and healthcare by non-evidence based opinions or purely economic
considerations. One recent example is the discussion about the safety of
the vaccine against the 2009 swine flu outbreak when a great deal of
mistrust and unfounded theories heavily influenced people’s will-
ingness to be vaccinated (Cohen and Enserink 2009; Seale et al., 2011).
For example in Scandinavia, great scepticism towards vaccines under-
mined global vaccination campaigns (e.g. the Mumps, Measles, Rubella
vaccine for children)2. Due to our increasingly connected world, espe-
cially in the last decade, a lot of misinformation spreads through social
media and is accessible to all, leading to the politicisation of science
(Deming, 2005; Jasanoff, 2005; Davies, 2019) and the organisation of
ignorance (Frickel & Vincent, 2007; Knowles, 2014; Wieland, 2017).
This adds complexity to the interface between policy, science and
practice and underlines the importance of knowledge management and
consistent sharing of best practice in the domain of risk mitigation
(Daszak et al., 2020).
The challenge to achieve sharing of best practices for risk mitigation
during the current COVID-19 pandemic is high (Koonin, 2020). It re-
quires mechanisms that build upon knowing how to evaluate, plan,
implement and maintain risk mitigation measures, along with appro-
priately deciding who to involve (Renn, 2008; Di Nucci et al., 2017),
making decisions about the chain of command, and channelling com-
munication. Communication and information sharing foster democratic
learning across governments and sectors, amongst varied stakeholders
(decision-makers, scientists, practitioners and citizens), and between
different levels of society (international, national, regional and local)
(Tompkins et al., 2008). These mechanisms are especially important
when they are able to bring together different regions of the world in
discussing and preparing for the different phases of a pandemic, quickly
understanding lessons learned and applying them in the regions that are
going through the earlier steps of the process. An excellent example of
an existing mechanism is the European Union’s Chemical Biological
Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation Centres of Excellence In-
itiative (EU CBRN CoE), which was launched in 2010 to strengthen and
structure the institutional capacity and country mechanisms outside the
European Union with regard to prevention, preparedness and response
of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks. This initiative
addresses risks of criminal origin (e.g. the Sarin attack on the Japanese
subway; Okumura et al., 1998a,b), accidentally created (e.g. Bhopal,
Broughton, 2005) or naturally occurring (e.g. swine flu outbreak,
COVID-19 pandemic). The EU CBRN CoE is led, financed and im-
plemented by the European Commission, in close coordination with the
European External Action Service (EEAS) and with the support of the
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
(UNICRI) and other International Organisations and local experts. The
EU CBRN CoE is active in 61 countries in eight regions, each region
hosting a Regional Secretariat, and each country with a National Focal
Point and a CBRN National Team (see Fig. 1).
Through activities led by the EU CBRN CoE initiative, many coun-
tries have elaborated CBRN national action plans, notably against
biological threats, creating awareness and mechanisms3 to structure
prevention, preparedness and response during disasters. These plans
include the establishment of a chain of command, the identification of
national stakeholders, decision-making procedures, enhanced inter-
agency communication, stockpiles of PPEs, medicines, drills, commu-
nication procedures, etc. Over the last ten years, 25 projects (out of a
total of 82 to date) have focused on capacity building in the domains of
biosafety and biosecurity including the identification of risk mitigation
measures for biological disasters.4 With the help of the EU CBRN CoE
network, the project outcomes are being activated for quick response to
the spread of the virus, by quickly compiling the experiences and by
keeping in touch through the regional secretariats using virtual meeting
tools. Other initiatives could take the same approach, disseminating
risk mitigation actions such as the ones compiled in the present paper.
By studying the literature, media and national information chan-
nels, in light of the current pandemic, we have collated and clustered
the risk mitigation measures taken around the globe first in the effort to
contain and since March 11, 2020 to mitigate the risks of COVID-19 by
limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2 (Li et al., 2020). The objective is to
make this clustering globally available and to harmonise its termi-
nology so that governments and sectors gain valuable time to put
adequate measures in place. Furthermore, the intention of this paper is
to highlight the importance of building trust, by improving effective
communication processes with cross-country and cross-sectoral in-
formation sharing, enhancing the learning process (Edelman Trust
Barometer, 2020), and in turn enhancing risk governance mechanisms
(Keping, 2018).
2. From COVID-19 risk perception to risk mitigation
Three adult patients with severe pneumonia were admitted to a
hospital in Wuhan on December 27, 2019, two of whom were linked to
the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market (Zhu et al., 2020). Patients 1
and 3 recovered and were discharged from the hospital on January 16,
2020. Patient 2 died on January 9, 2020. Evidence for the presence of
SARS-CoV-2 was found by the identification in bronchoalveolar-lavage
fluid in the three patients by whole-genome sequencing, direct PCR,
and culture (Zhu et al., 2020). Before the end of December 2019, still
few people knew that this new virus existed.
As the infection spread within the city of Wuhan local health
workers alarmed local authorities and the outbreak got international
attention via media coverage. In early January local risk mitigation
measures were implemented including the closure of the Huanan
Seafood Wholesale Market. At that time for the rest of the world,
especially outside Asia, business continued as usual and any risk per-
ception was considered minimal. On January 12, 2020 China shared the
genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-25 and on January 13, 2020 the first case
was reported outside China: a patient in Thailand reported to have
visited the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market6. Due to the absence of a
2 https://www.who.int/vaccine_safety/committee/topics/influenza/
pandemic/h1n1_safety_assessing/narcolepsy_statement/en/.
3 https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/sites/fpi/files/documents/icsp-strategy-paper-
mip-20140812_en.pdf.
4 https://europa.eu/cbrn-risk-mitigation/projects_en.
5 https://www.who.int/csr/don/12-january-2020-novel-coronavirus-china/
en/.
6 https://www.who.int/csr/don/14-january-2020-novel-coronavirus-
thailand-ex-china/en/.
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cure or a vaccine, controlling the infection to prevent the spread of
COVID-19 was correctly seen as the only intervention that could be
used (Lai et al., 2020). Consequent risk mitigation measures were soon
after announced in Wuhan (holiday extension, city lockdown, quar-
antine requirements) (Lin et al., 2020) and in neighbouring cities and
regions. Other areas and countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea and Mongolia followed with almost daily announcements of ever
more strict risk mitigation measures to limit the spread. These com-
prised of travel restrictions, isolation of travellers coming from the
Wuhan region, closure of schools and universities and the prescription
of hygienic measures (see the timeline of the events in Fig. 2). On
January 30, 2020 the WHO Emergency Committee convened for a
second time under the IHR2005 rules (World Health Organisation,
2008) and declared the outbreak as fulfilling the criteria for being a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).7 At this
time, related discussions started in European countries but still dra-
matic measures such as locking down entire cities, regions or countries
was not considered (Kervorkian et al., 2020). Concern grew but no real
changes occurred, since the perception of the risk was still low and
individual and group behaviour was not affected. This status started to
Fig. 1. The countries that join the initiative work together in eight regions, headed up by a secretariat at regional level.
Fig. 2. Time line of events and application of COVID-19 risk mitigation measures.
7 https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30–01-2020-statement-on-the-
second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-
committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov).
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change when two regions in Italy (Veneto and Lombardy) faced a rapid
growth in the number of infected people, forcing the Italian Authorities
to lockdown the most affected villages first, then the entire Northern
part of the country and finally the entire country. Other countries fol-
lowed, albeit with a one to two week delay. At the time of writing, the
Italian health care system is still fighting the crisis and remains on the
brink of collapse experiencing innumerable numbers of hospitalised
patients, a scarcity of intensive care beds, medical staff (over 60 doctors
in Italy have died8), PPEs, ventilators and medicines. Although in dif-
ferent degrees, other countries are also experiencing similar challenges,
including Spain and the United States.9
Looking at what seems to be the critical points in reaching an ‘out-
of-control’ situation in Italy, we note that while many Italian first re-
sponders did their utmost to contain the virus, many citizens in Italy did
not comply with restrictions at first, and it took some time and multiple
efforts of the authorities to communicate to the population why com-
pliance with the restrictions was important. It is believed that one of the
critical moments of spread was the Champions League football match
played in the San Siro stadium in Milan on February 19, 2020 where
about 40,000 football fans from Bergamo – which became the hotspot
in the Northern region of Italy in the following weeks - attended and
afterwards filled up the bars and restaurants around the stadium10.
Most strikingly, while the Northern Regions already had many restric-
tions being most importantly self-quarantine, social/physical distan-
cing, hygienic measures and a lock down of the Northern region, the
weekend of March 7–8 is believed to have caused the collapse of the
respective regional health system in the weeks thereafter, by coinciding
with the celebration of the International Women’s Day. Following Italy,
other European countries were experiencing rapidly increasing num-
bers of COVID-19 patients in the time after the spring break. It is be-
lieved that many people became infected in Alpine ski resorts during
the spring break spreading the virus upon their return. Consequently, as
another mitigation measure European ski resorts were shut down.11
Many countries followed Italy implementing risk mitigation mea-
sures starting from advisory, to recommendable and finally enforceable
measures. Interestingly though, and similarly to the experience in Italy,
the process of risk perception and the translation to compliance and
trust in taking risk mitigation measures also took time in other coun-
tries (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2020), at the likely cost of additional
spread and contamination. As health is a national responsibility in the
EU (not regulated by the European Union), many countries have ap-
plied different levels of risk mitigation measures and followed different
communication strategies. These ranged from the acceptance of a
propagation in view of promoting group immunity (mainly in the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden12,13) to strategies to fully
protecting all individuals, mainly to prevent overwhelming the
healthcare systems but also in the interest of awaiting the results from
ongoing medical trials on treatments and studies about individual and
group immunity (Kwok et al., 2020). In an attempt to understand these
fundamental differences, the authors believe that this is related to the
differences of the societal structure as seen in Northern regions in
Europe and many parts of the US (Northern structure) versus the
Southern European, Arab, Asian and Latin world (Southern structure).
The Northern structure is based on elderly people living in retirement
homes (similar to parts of the US) and elderly living alone. The
Southern structure is based on large(r) families living under the same
roof and across multiple generations. Because inside retirement homes
disease can rapidly spread due to the higher risk group, leading to
segmented, high mortality numbers,14 retirement homes were locked
down and the assumption may have been made that the elderly living
alone may stand a better chance of not contracting the disease at all.
3. Clusters of COVID-19 risk mitigation measures
Risk mitigation is an interdisciplinary decision-making process
based on information from risk and exposure assessment (Bruinen de
Bruin et al., 2007). It entails consideration of political, socioeconomic,
epidemiological, (mental) health and engineering data to compile reg-
ulatory options and select the appropriate regulatory, societal, sector or
company response to COVID-19. At the time of writing many countries
have taken risk mitigation measures and are trying to prepare for the
future by looking at countries that are ahead in the course of the pan-
demic and learning from their experiences (Wu and McGoogan, 2020).
To better understand the underlying differences and to harmonise
terminology, the risk mitigation measures were clustered into various
categories. The categorisation along with the timeline of events are il-
lustrated in Fig. 2.
Reviewing the risk mitigation measures implemented by numerous
countries the measures were clustered according to the following ca-
tegories:
1. Mobility Restrictions. These aim to limit the movement of people in
order to contain or to slow down the spread of the virus. It reduces
the number of people who can be infected by both symptomatic and
non-symptomatic uncontained cases (Gostic et al., 2020; Hellewell
et al., 2020). Restrictions comprise active zoning, closing/limiting
public transportation, air traffic restrictions or even temporary
closure, limiting use of private cars, bicycles, and outdoor activities
such as walking (some countries only allowed walking outside with
a dog) and running, particularly in groups of more than two people;
2. Socio-economic restrictions. These target social and economic activ-
ities where people gather for educational, recreational, sportive, or
work-related purposes. Restrictions comprise the closure or limiting
of schools/nurseries/child-care and homes for the elderly, closure of
museums, swimming pools, bars and restaurants, indoor and out-
door sport facilities and hotels. Suspension of retail trade, save for
essential goods (including food, medicines and their supply chains)
with banking, financial and insurance services also belonging to this
cluster. Additional examples are the promotion/obligation of tele-
working, limiting/cancellation of production in factories;
3. Physical Distancing; These measures have also been referred to as
social distancing. In fact, physical distancing is regarded as a more
appropriate term to avoid social isolation especially of fragile groups
such as the elderly, given that with a proper distance (currently
defined between 1.5 and 2 m) it is still possible to be social; it also
embraces virtual social connections. Other examples entail the
prohibition of groups larger than 2–3 persons, closing public out-
door spaces (parks, benches, beaches, etc.) and imposing regulations
in terms of entrances and number of people present per square
meter, required distance between humans/occupants in indoor
spaces comprising offices, meeting places and commercial spaces;
4. Hygiene Measures; These aim to limit the risk of spreading the virus
and direct or indirect contamination of others. Recommendations
comprise washing hands for at least 20 s, sneezing in elbow,
avoiding touching surfaces, contactless payments (avoid exchanging
money), wearing PPEs such as masks, eye and hand protections,
household waste disposal instructions preventing contact with
8 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/coronavirus-italy-
doctor-death-toll-gp-a9438896.html.
9 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/03/de-blasio-new-york-
coronavirus.
10 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/24/bergamo-mayor-
says-football-match-escalated-coronavirus-infections-italian-provinceMany.
11 https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-european-ski-resorts-close-early-
to-stop-covid-19-spread-11957732.
12 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52135814.
13 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52076293.
14 https://nos.nl/artikel/2329504-kerkdienst-in-verpleeghuis-lijkt-
coronahaard-nooit-gedacht-aan-heftige-gevolgen.html.
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contaminated infectious materials by waste collectors and waste
processing operators, worker protection (Semple and Cherrie, 2020)
in the places where physical distancing is not feasible (e.g. place-
ment of protective glass in supermarkets between cashier and cus-
tomer), precautionary and sickness driven quarantine (family vs.
individual), targeted symptomatic screening upon arrival or en-
trance such as obliged temperature check or (large scale) testing;
5. Communication; This cluster is, in the authors view, the most es-
sential part of risk mitigation measures since it drives the public
understanding, trust, acceptance and compliance with the measures.
Especially in societies where large-scale disasters were absent for
decades, as is the case in many countries since WWII, where mistrust
in authorities prevail and/or where individual freedom became the
norm, above caring for the group, the communication of risk miti-
gation measures during a major crisis situation adds significant
challenges. In March 2020 a WHO ‘WhatsApp’ group was set up,
providing information and risk mitigation instructions related to
categories 1–4. Countries also launched national communication
measures structured in news and information websites/platforms
jointly combatting fake news, aiming to encourage awareness, un-
derstanding and compliance towards restrictions;
6. International support mechanisms; As the world is fighting the same
threat, and many countries are limited in their capacity and re-
sources, the importance of acting internationally is acknowledged,
as exemplified by the following actions: countries, sectors and
companies increased global production and international exchange
of PPE’s, raw materials for pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical for-
mulations, basic medical drugs, and ventilators. Existing risk miti-
gation networks were quickly activated, and new transnational
platforms are being set up for knowledge exchange on clinical trials,
treatments, lessons learned and publications15.
4. Early signs of effectiveness
At the time of writing, increasing information is being generated
about the experiences in mitigating COVID-19. Although it is difficult to
precisely understand the effectiveness of each category of risk mitiga-
tion measure the currently available literature has been studied.
Mobility Restrictions. Early analysis of the Wuhan COVID-19 out-
break suggest that the effects of travel limitations are important for
national and international agencies dealing with public health response
planning. Chinazzi et al. (2020) showed that by January 23, 2020 the
epidemic had already spread to other cities within China and therefore
the travel quarantine around Wuhan had only modestly delayed the
epidemic spread to other areas of China. The Wuhan travel ban was
initially effective at reducing international case exportations but not to
limit the already ongoing spread outside China. Most importantly, this
study showed that additional travel limitations up to 90% of the traffic
has a modest effect unless paired with public health interventions and
behavioural changes that achieve a considerable reduction in the dis-
ease transmissibility in the communities, as also confirmed during the
SARS outbreak in Singapore (Drake et al., 2006). These findings un-
derline the importance of quick response based on proper early detec-
tion and epidemiological risk analysis, in combination with the appli-
cation of additional risk mitigation measures. In addition, disease
experts estimate that each COVID-19 patient/carrier infects between
two to three others.16 Each risk mitigation measure contributes to a
decrease in new infections (Anderson et al., 2020). In order for these
restrictions to be effective it is believed that testing, registering number
of hospitalisations and deaths in the weeks after the restrictions are key
to tracking the effectiveness of the measures. At present, the effec-
tiveness of each measure cannot be quantitatively assessed. However,
the authors of this paper believe in the application of the precautionary
principle meaning that application of a combination of mitigation
measures – even those without current clear scientific evidence such as
school closures (Anderson et al., 2020) – is the best practice to gain
most time in decreasing the rate of new infections (Hellewell et al.,
2020).
Socio-economic restrictions: The implementation of socio-economic
restrictions occurred gradually within most countries and even up to
date there are major differences between countries in terms of the
closing down of public places. The most plausible reason is that these
restrictions are expected to impose a major impact on the functioning of
the current economy and way of life (Nicholson et al., 2019). A recent
analysis of smartphone location data by the U.S. search engine giant
Google showed that visits to shops, parks or railway stations fell steeply
in most European countries between February 16 and March 29 2020 as
governments sought to slow the explosive spread of the COVID-19
disease.17 Reuters reported that in Italy and Spain, retail and recrea-
tional trips were down by 94%. Physical presence in workplaces also
decreased by over 60% in respective countries. Both Italy and Spain,
along with France imposed near lockdown of their states, and, by the
time of writing, the restrictions they have imposed are, with a time lag,
starting to ‘flatten the curve’ of new infections at least in some countries
(Financial Times, April 4, 2020). These latest findings add to the sug-
gestion that the combination of different categories of risk mitigation
measures contribute most successfully to the fastest decrease of new
infections, given the geographic scale and severity of COVID-19.
Physical Distancing. Individual behaviour is crucial in controlling the
spread of COVID-19. In early March 2020 Anderson et al. (2020) de-
scribed that in Western democracies personal action, rather than gov-
ernment action, might be the most important issue comprising of early
self-isolation (within one day from symptom onset), seeking medical
advice remotely unless symptoms are severe, and physical distancing.
The same authors described the importance of the application of a
combination of mitigation measures such as physical distancing in
combination with the ban of mass gatherings, good diagnostic facilities
and remotely accessed health advice, together with specialised treat-
ment for people with severe COVID-19 infections. A combination of
these measures was suggested to lead to a 60% reduction in transmis-
sion. At the time of writing, many Western democracies also experi-
enced the effects of the lack of awareness of a significant portion of the
population leading to non-compliance with the recommended or ob-
ligatory restrictions. As a result, in the course of days, governments
increasingly implemented a combination of communication strategies
(outdoor signs, use of social media, drones informing the public) in
combination with enforcement strategies giving increasing fines to
groups that were violating the ever more stringent restriction measures.
Germany established on March 22, 2020 a fine of up to 25,000 euro for
gathering in groups of more than 3 persons.18 The Netherlands reported
on March 27, 2020 the arrest of an individual coughing in the face of a
police officer while claiming to be infected with COVID-19.19
Niud and Xu (2020) reported that transmission by people with mild
15 https://www.who.int/thailand/news/detail/20–03-2020-thailand-joins-
the-who-solidarity-trial-global-testing-of-effective-treatments-of-covid-19-
across-8-countries-an-aggressive-effort-to-save-lives-from-the-
pandemic.https://presse.inserm.fr/lancement-dun-essai-clinique-europeen-
contre-le-covid-19/38737/.https://www.elsevier.com/connect/coronavirus-
information-center.
16 https://www.sciencealert.com/the-new-coronavirus-isn-t-like-the-flu-but-
(footnote continued)
they-have-one-big-thing-in-common.
17 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-google-europe/
europes-north–south-lockdown-divide-revealed-by-google-data-
idUSKBN21L1US; https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/.
18 https://www.nu.nl/coronavirus/6039503/duitsland-verbiedt-
samenscholing-van-meer-dan-twee-personen.htm.
19 https://www.at5.nl/artikelen/200958/man-hoest-agent-in-gezicht-na-
arrestatie-ik-heb-corona.
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or no symptoms can undermine the effectiveness of the isolation
strategy because of reduced likelihood of isolating all cases and tracing
all contacts. The identification and testing of potential cases needs
therefore to be as extensive as is permitted by healthcare and diagnostic
testing capacity—including the identification, testing, and isolation of
suspected cases with no or mild disease (e.g., influenza-like illness). In
the fight against COVID-19, early control measures such as isolation
and contact tracing could gain more power, thanks to modern tech-
nology. The authors believe that detection combined with contact tra-
cing should continue to be an important measure to control the out-
break.
Hygiene Measures. Wild animals were slaughtered in the Wuhan
market, increasing the risk of human exposure to blood and to other
animal fluids with high risk of being exposed to wild animal viruses.
’Wet’ markets such as these are poorly viewed by many countries in the
world who are now combatting the consequences of the outbreak.
However, it should be borne in mind that similar ‘wet’ markets exist in
several other places around the world such as in Africa, Asia and South
America, with cultural habits and behaviour being hard to change. The
authors believe the solution lies with the avoidance of mixing wild and
domestic animals in indoor and outdoor spaces, and prohibition of on-
the-spot slaughtering of animals in markets due to very weak hygienic
measures. For many years already, Western countries have enforced the
systematic use of slaughterhouses with very strict hygienic measures
and authority control. In a recent announcement, Chinese authorities
(temporarily) prohibited these wild life markets as of March 202020
adding to the long list of risk mitigation measures currently being
taken.
WHO, CDC, ECDC and other international/European organisations
have been drawing attention to the importance of hand hygiene for
many years. The WHO began drawing up guidelines in 2004 and have
produced specific guidelines for ‘Hand Hygiene in Health Care’ in
200921 and in general.22 Apart from the six languages on the WHO site,
most countries have this information available in their official language
(s).
The message regarding use, or not, of face masks has been very
unclear, also internationally. This lack of clarity has been compounded
by the lack of suitable masks, such as those meeting the technical
specifications of FFP2 and FFP3, covered by Regulation (EU) 2016/425
on Personal Protective Equipment. Moreover, surgical masks, which
seem effective in clinical settings at reducing the risk of infection for
professionals, do not provide adequate protection during Aerosol
Generating Procedures (AGPs). Therefore, masks need to be used in
combination with other PPE measures23 (Smith et al., 2016; Long et al.,
2020). For the ECDC the use of face masks is of highest priority in
healthcare workers but also in symptomatic confirmed/suspected cases
of COVID-19 and those caring for them. Instead, WHO and others
health authorities do not recommend the use of face mask for the
general public.24 Whether the recommendation by Western countries
(US, UK, and the majority of EU) that the public should not wear face
masks, is or not motivated by the need to preserve limited supplies for
professional use in health-care settings is unclear. In parts of Asia
(China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore) and recently in some EU
countries (Czech Republic and Austria), all citizens have been en-
couraged to wear face masks in public, regardless of whether they have
symptoms. Austria and Italy have joined a small but growing number of
European countries making the wearing of face masks outside the home
compulsory amid shifting debate over the medical gear’s protective
utility.25 Authorities started distributing millions of free face masks at
the entrances to all supermarkets from April 01, 2020 in Austria.
Shoppers will only be permitted inside supermarkets and other open
stores, such as pharmacies, if they are wearing masks. The Lombardy
region of Italy made the outdoor wearing of masks or scarfs in combi-
nation with gloves obligatory as of April 04, 2020 (Ordinanza N.52126).
According to research on the SARS epidemic, face masks (surgical and
FFP2/N95) were an effective intervention for reducing the contraction
and spread of the virus (Jefferson et al., 2011). As evidence suggests
that nearly half of SARS-CoV-2 transmissions occur before the infected
person becomes symptomatic, a consistent and proper use of face masks
by the general population could offer a partial additional benefit to the
other essential mitigation measures such as hand hygiene and isolation
of infected people. Moreover, universal use of face masks could prevent
discrimination of individuals who wear masks when unwell because
everybody is wearing a mask (Feng et al., 2020; Leung et al., 2020).
Hence, there is some rationale for mask-wearing in the general popu-
lation, even if there is evidence disputing this. However, during a
pandemic from a new respiratory virus such as SARS-CoV-2, in the
absence of specific and well-tested pharmaceutical interventions, masks
might well play a role in reducing transmission, in particular when
physical distancing is not possible. This is probably why in the U.S., the
CDC is reportedly contemplating a change in guidance.
A recent EC communication (Commission Recommendation EU
2020 403 13 March 202027) clarifies many questions including for e.g.
those of critical service providers (who will not be able to avail of
government supplies destined for health workers), under what condi-
tions they may provide their employees with non-CE labelled masks,
assuming they can import their own supply. Also at European level, one
of the risk mitigation measures taken was the creation of a strategic
rescEU stockpile of medical equipment such as ventilators and protec-
tive masks to help EU countries in the context of the COVID-19 pan-
demic.28 Part of the stockpile will include items such as: (i) intensive
care medical equipment such as ventilators, (ii) personal protective
equipment such as reusable masks, (iii) vaccines and therapeutics and
(iv) laboratory supplies. It remains to be seen how quickly the European
Member States will be able to avail of this stockpile.
Communication; During the outbreak crisis it is key to have trust-
worthy and well-coordinated communication channels to create com-
munity trust and compliance. Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and South
Korea are among those that stabilised the cumulative number of cases
within two to three weeks after the 100th case (FT Analysis of John
Hopkins University, CSSE, March 14, 2020). These countries quickly
applied a combination of risk mitigation measures such as school clo-
sures, strict quarantine and isolation measures and contact tracing.
Moreover, data studied at the time of March 16, 2020 suggests that a
strong community response to the risk mitigation measures commu-
nicated by the authorities is key to stabilising the cumulative increase
of the spread of COVID-19. This demonstrates the importance of citizen
awareness, social trust in authorities and well-coordinated risk miti-
gation communication.
International support mechanism; Avoiding an uncontrollable world
pandemic requires the implementation of a global mechanism, built and
empowered to act at an unprecedented speed (Niud and Xu, 2020). As
20 https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/05/asia/china-coronavirus-wildlife-
consumption-ban-intl-hnk/index.html.
21 https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44102/
9789241597906_eng.pdf;jsessionid=
41E5DD6BBC1CE944DDB5F1EEF9FF7C23?sequence=1.
22 https://www.who.int/gpsc/clean_hands_protection/en/.
23 https://www.cebm.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/COVID-CAT-PPE-
MASKS-9-REVISED-002.pdf.
24 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/
advice-for-public/when-and-how-to-use-masks.
25 https://www.ft.com/content/f68f3063-5024–4654-9389-bcc7ee1efd8e.
26 https://www.regione.lombardia.it/wps/portal/istituzionale/HP/
DettaglioRedazionale/servizi-e-informazioni/cittadini/salute-e-prevenzione/
Prevenzione-e-benessere/red-coronavirusnuoviaggiornamenti.
27 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
CELEX:32020H0403).
28 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_476.
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Hellewell et al. (2020) described, the time window of early response is
potentially extremely short, signifying that, once the number of initial
cases increases to a few tenths (40 cases seems to be a critical number),
the probability of failure to control is high, i.e. at 80% even if 80% of
contacts are traced and isolated. In this context, global coordination is
mandatory and help should be quickly directed to the focal points of
viral spread. Some effective measures include the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, factories, retailers (of medicines, PPE, etc.) are collaborating
better and re-directing their production lines to COVID-19 related
products. For example, high-level fashion brands such as Armani,
Gucci, and others are producing masks and protective garments for
healthcare workers, and alcoholic beverage brands are directing their
production to disinfectant gel. In addition, solidarity is removing some
commercial confidentiality barriers, forming novel supply chains, or
easing trade restrictions under certain circumstances, while increasing
them on others. For example, the EU introduced a temporary (6 weeks)
export ban on certain medical/protective equipment to destinations
outside the EU (Commission Implementing Regulation 2020/402, 14
March 202029).
5. Conclusions and recommendations
The general lack of understanding of this new virus led to confusion
and mixed advice from professionals and authorities. The global com-
munity (political, medical and international organisations) were taken
by complete surprise in its rapid spread from China and establishment
of community spread in Italy, Iran, Spain and at present in the US. At
the time of writing the world is overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients
and countries are applying risk mitigation measures at an un-
precedented level with almost daily updates. In Europe, in the current
major hotspots in Italy and Spain, and recently in the US, in New York,
hospitals are being overwhelmed and responders are combatting the
pandemic by all possible means. Since the rules and policies adopted by
many countries differ as well as societal and population structure, and
healthcare systems, the mitigation measures will likely lead to various
results. It will be interesting to see the exact impact of the different
strategies but unfortunately it is still too early, and it is not yet possible
to give quantitative advice. The intention of this paper is to highlight
the importance of building trust, improving effective communication
processes with cross-country and cross-sectoral information sharing,
enhancing the learning process, and in turn enhancing risk governance
mechanisms. The conceptual analysis in this paper aimed to provide a
structure in the countless risk mitigation measures taken around the
world knowing it is a snapshot in time and lots of effort is currently
being undertaken. The authors collated and clustered risk mitigation
measures, using a harmonisation of the taxonomical approach, avail-
able for countries combatting the COVID-19 pandemic and investing in
the limitation of the spread of the virus. Our work mainly focusses on
the limitation of the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus causing COVID-19.
Current knowledge reveals that:
• The information published on risk mitigation measures and their
effectiveness is difficult to find and more and more papers are being
published every day;
• COVID-19 demonstrates the weaknesses of the current systems; the
world was insufficiently prepared, scientific warnings were not
picked up quickly enough, there were confusing messages and trust
building took too much time. Specifically, many countries started
with processes such as understanding the problem from the begin-
ning and not building upon existing knowledge and best practices of
other countries. This lead to similar outcomes such as disbelief,
underestimation of the scale and potential danger and losing
valuable time in jointly implementing the best risk mitigation
practices. Besides the differences between countries in terms of
cultures or economic prosperity, this pandemic demonstrates the
unpreparedness of many health systems lacking mechanisms and
materials to adequately respond to a quickly spreading infection,
relying on societal and economic improvisation;
• It is suggested that countries where the elderly live among the
general population, impose more strict restrictive mitigation mea-
sures than countries where the elderly are separated from the gen-
eral population;
• Several restrictions have proven effective in slowing down the
spread of COVID-19, but the highest effect is obtained by applying a
combination of measures representing different aims. In this regard:
o It is recommended for all countries to invest in preventive risk
mitigation resources limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2 com-
prising physical distancing measures and hygienic measures; this
is particularly important for countries with fewer resources.
o It is recommended to impose a combination of mitigation mea-
sures limiting the spread by individuals who become ill after
being missed by a screening programme. To this end screening
programmes need to be improved and applied on a large(r) scale,
along with registering the number of hospitalisations and deaths.
Contact tracing is important even if many countries are now be-
lieved to have passed this phase due to too high number of in-
fections. New technologies could be applied in this respect.
o It is believed that correctly wearing appropriate face masks is
beneficial when physical distancing is not possible to ensure all
the time. The spread of small drops containing SARS-CoV-2 is
difficult to predict (think of air currents, convections and air hu-
midity), and it is more likely that individuals will touch their face
(mouth/nose) less frequently than without a mask. It seems that
countries who have more effectively curtailed an expanding pro-
pagation are countries whose population used masks extensively;
• A clear and coordinated communication strategy on effective risk
mitigation is crucial in building trust with the citizens in a quickly
evolving situation, using all possible channels and combatting fake
news.
• Existing global mechanisms need strengthened benefiting from in-
terlinked national health mechanisms. Being part of a network of
first responders, practitioners or risk mitigation stakeholders is an
added value in this scenario; for example, several partner countries
of the EU CBRN CoE are reporting to have greatly benefited from the
structures that were put in place thanks to the Initiative and, at least
in some countries, this mechanism has been found very useful to
mobilise a coordinated response;
• Citizens’ trust related to the degree of risk mitigation measures in
place and parties involved in the communication is highly variable
across countries. This is expected to influence citizens’ behaviour
and respective implementation and obedience of the imposed risk
mitigation measures. Some countries are also creating child-friendly
Covid 19 communication material such as comics30, TV and online
broadcasted news31. In countries and cultures with a higher degree
of trust in science, authorities, and with adequate science based
communication, faster changes are expected;
• The delay in imposing risk mitigation measures is crucial and can
make the difference between a local outbreak with few cases to a
pandemic with countless sick and deceased citizens. The window of
opportunity for full containment is believed to be limited to a si-
tuation with a very low number of infected people (maximum 40
cases);
• Proper early detection based on early warnings would lower the
29 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=
CELEX:32020R0402).
30 https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/news/newsfeatures/covid19-updates/
partner-resources/.
31 https://jeugdjournaal.nl/.
Y. Bruinen de Bruin, et al. Safety Science 128 (2020) 104773
7
intervention time. Such a mechanism should be based on a response
time of hours, rather than days.
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